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MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution:
A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?
ANDREW GRIFFIN'
As global commerce has grown over the past several decades, so too has
the world's hunger for oil. The amount of oil it takes to satisfy this demand
on just a daily basis is staggering. Every day, an estimated 100,000,000
tons of oil are ferried between the ports of shippers and consuming nations.'
Given the volume of oil shipped over the oceans, as well as the scale of the
supertankers involved,2 it is not surprising that some oil makes its way into
the oceans. Vessels annually release some one to two million tons of oil
into the marine environment.' Sometimes the release is related to ship
operations; other times it is due to accidental spills. In both cases, the
oceans are degraded.'
Disasters such as the Exxon Valdez grounding provide gripping
illustrations of the problem of vessel pollution.' Since these large coastal
spills are both newsworthy and accessible, television regularly treats viewers
eto up to the minute pictures of the ensuing ecological harm. As a result,
the public, galvanized by graphic images of blackened beaches and oil
* B.A., 1990, Wesleyan University; J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law.
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1. Paul S. Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in Environmental Law-Oil Pollution of the
Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 459, 460 (1984).
2. In 1960, more than half the ships in the world fleet were under 50,000 deadweight tons
(dwt). There were only a few "supertankers" of over 100,000 dwt. By 1970, 45% of the world tanker
fleet were ships of more than 105,000 dwt. By 1980, more than half of the fleet consisted of tankers
of more than 200,000 dwt, with several ships breaking the 500,000 dwt barrier. The Fight Against
Marine Pollution, 3 IMO NEWS 8 (1982).
3. Bill Shaw et al., The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution,
27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157, 157 (1987).
4. Oil pollution contains a host of toxic chemicals. There are, for example, 100-200 known
carcinogens in every 10,000 pounds of oil released into the oceans. While spills have the immediate
effect of killing waterfowl and mammals, the more insidious harm is the disruption of the food chain
caused by these carcinogens. First, oil pollution kills the coastal phytoplankton which feed commercial
fish, thereby causing a reduction in harvests. Second, the feed organisms which survive introduce the
oil toxins into the food chain as they are consumed. Dempsey, supra note 1, at 467-68.
5. The spill was the biggest human-caused disaster in U.S. history. More than 36,000
waterfowl died, along with more than 1,000 sea otters and 144 bald eagles. Exxon spent over $2 billion
in clean-up costs, and agreed to pay over $I billion to avoid facing criminal charges. Settlement Reached
On Exxon Oil Spill, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 1992, at 4.
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soaked birds, puts pressure on national governments to take stronger
measures to prevent future 1pills.
However, these tanker accidents, while damaging, are not the only
threat. An additional source of vessel pollution comes from operational
discharges on the high seas. Away from the watchful eyes of television,
many vessels discharge water contaminated as a result of normal ship
operations. Of the oil released by vessels, seventy-five percent is reported
to have come from operational discharges and twenty-five percent from
accidental spills.6 If there is a need to prevent ship spills, then there must
also be an equal or greater need to prevent operational discharges.
In 1983, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships 19737 and its 1978 Protocol8 (MARPOL 73/78) came into
force.' This treaty is the international community's answer to the problem
of vessel pollution. Since international commerce is vitally dependent upon
sea transport, MARPOL 73/78 attempts to strike a balance between the need
to protect and preserve the marine environment and the desire not to impose
laws which make shipping prohibitively expensive. Additionally, MARPOL
73/78 had to create an environmental enforcement regime which balanced
conflicting jurisdictional claims made by flag states and coastal states.
Whereas flag states historically had, and wanted to preserve, exclusive
jurisdiction over their vessels, coastal states wanted to be given authority to
enforce MARPOL 73/78 against the ships of other nations.
"In 1992, major amendments to MARPOL 73/78 were adopted
concerning the design and construction of both new and existing tankers.' °
These amendments came into force in July 1993." Directed toward
reducing the environmental damage caused by spills, these amendments
require that tankers be outfitted with either a double-hull or an equally
6. Shaw et al., supra note 3, at 157.
7. This treaty's full title is even more cumbersome: International Conference on Marine
Pollution: Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319
[hereinafter MARPOL 73].
8. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL 78]. This protocol effectively
absorbed the earlier convention. The combined instruments are known as MARPOL 73/78. See infra
text accompanying note 31.
9. MARPOL 73/78 Enters into Force, 4 IMO NEws 7 (1983).
10. MARPOL 73/78 Amended for New and Existing Tankers, 2 IMO NEWS 3 (1992).
!1. IMO Provision Requiring Double-hulls on New Ships Takes Effect, Agency Announces, BNA
INT'L ENV'T DAILY, July 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
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effective alternative. These changes were controversial because of the great
costs they placed upon shipowners, who questioned the effectiveness of the
double-hull design, and who argued that there were other less costly design
solutions which should have been considered. As with past debates over
MARPOL 73/78, the final amendments reflected a compromise between
divergent interests.
This Comment seeks to evaluate whether MARPOL 73/78's
compromises were effective ones. Part I considers operational discharges.
Part II discusses the history leading up to MARPOL 73/78. Part III
explores the mechanics of MARPOL 73/78's regulations and enforcement
regime. Part IV critiques the treaty. Part V describes the double-hull
amendment to MARPOL 73/78. Part VI concludes that MARPOL 73/78 is
an effective treaty, not because it rigorously regulates operational discharges,
but because it imposes structural and equipment standards upon ships which
eliminate or reduce the sources of dirty discharges. Recent amendments,
requiring that tankers be additionally outfitted with double-hulls, are a
natural extension and refinement of this "structural" emphasis. This
Comment also concludes that while the compromises found within
MARPOL 73/78 did favor shipping interests and flag states in the short run,
these compromises were necessary to ratify the Convention, and their impact
has diminished over time. This comment argues that it was this pragmatic
approach-making concessions to industry in the short term in return for
greater environmental protection in the long term-which enabled the new
and controversial double-hull amendments to come into force.
I. OPERATIONAL DISCHARGES
There are two ship operations which pollute the oceans: ballasting and
cargo tank washings. Ballasting occurs after a tanker has discharged its
load. A crew fills up to one-third of the cargo tanks with sea water to
compensate for weight lost from the delivered payload. With this
replacement water as ballast, the ship displaces sufficient water to be
maneuverable during its trip back to the loading port. If a ship encounters
particularly rough weather during its return and needs more ballast to
stabilize the ship, it can fill its cargo tanks up to half capacity.' 2
12. R. MICHAEL M'GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 16 (1979).
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The pollution problems associated with ballast come from the water
being stored in the "empty" tanks used for transporting oil. When water is
placed in cargo tanks, it mixes with oil remnants on the walls and settled
residue on the floors. This contaminated ballast is discharged before
arriving in port. Since 0.35 percent of a ship's original cargo is left behind
after a shipment, 3 the oil content of a ballast discharge for a 200,000 ton
ship could amount to about 700 tons.
Tank washings are the other source of operational pollution. At the
same time a ship stores water in one-third of its tanks for ballast, water is
also used to clean an additional one-third of the tanks. This washing
prepares the hold for new and perhaps different types of cargo to be stored
and prevents the buildup of sludge. The resulting dirty washings, like the
ballast, are then discharged back into the ocean before returning to port.'4
While ballasting and tank washings are necessary vessel operations, their
discharges can be cleaned. There are several efficacious methods for
reducing or eliminating the pollution associated with operational discharges.
MARPOL 73/78 requires ships to utilize some or all of the following
methods: load on top, crude oil washings, and segregated ballast tanks.
A. Load on Top (LOT)
This is a procedure in which operational waters are allowed to settle
during the voyage back to the loading port. Given time, oil and water
mixtures left standing will separate: oil will gradually rise to the surface,
and the heavier clean water will sink. With LOT, the clean water is drawn
off the bottom, leaving behind concentrated oily residue which is then
transferred to a slop tank. 5 Once in port, new cargo is either "loaded on
top" of the oily slop, or the slop is transferred to reception facilities. The
difficulty with LOT is that in order to be effective it requires a skilled and
conscientious crew to follow the correct procedures. 6 Also, since the
separation process takes considerable time, LOT does not work well for
short coastal voyages. 7
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. COMMITEE ON TANK VESSEL DESIGN, TANKER SPILLS: PREVENTION BY DESIGN 50(1991).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
17. Jeff B. Curtis, Vessel-Source Oil Pollution and MARPOL 73/78: An International Success
Story?, 15 ENVTL. L. 679, 692 (1985).
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B. Crude Oil Washings (COWs)
This technique uses oil in place of water to clean off the walls of cargo
tanks. Because of the dissolving action of crude oil, COWs are the superior
method for reducing residues and sludge. COWs minimize operational
pollution caused by tank washing by reducing or eliminating the use of
water. 18
C. Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBTs)
SBTs are tanks which are designed for. carrying only ballast. SBTs
virtually eliminate the problems of oily ballast discharges because the holds
for ballast and oil are distinct. 9 With SBTs, the only possibility for ballast
contamination occurs when the ship needs to take on ballast beyond the
capacity of its ballast tanks. Where the weather would be particularly
treacherous, ballast would also be stored in the cargo tanks. 20 A cheaper
substitute for SBTs is Dedicated Clean Ballast Tanks (CBTs). With CBTs,
cargo tanks are set aside only for carrying ballast water.2' While in
principle CBTs can be as effective as SBTs, this is only true so long as the
tanks are kept clean of oil. The fact that CBTs share the same pumping and
piping arrangements as the regular cargo tanks raises the specter of
opportunistic crews filling them up without setting aside tanks for ballast.
18. The Fight Against Marine Pollution, supra note 2, at 10.
19. Illustrating the principle that for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction, it is
worth noting that SBTs are not without their own problems. While SBTs were designed to eliminate one
problem-oily discharges-they in turn create a new problem: travelling biomatter. Tankers travel the
globe and typically take in ballast water in one comer of the world which is later discharged at a
destination port thousands of miles away. This creates the potential for harmful organisms to enter and
spread to a new region via the discharge of ballast water and sediment from shipping. In Australia,
tankers are linked with the introduction of a type of algae known to cause paralytic shellfish poisoning
in humans; in the United Kingdom, sargassum muticum, a seaweed from the Pacific, has made itself at
home; and in the Great Lakes, it is estimated that it will cost $4-5 billion to control the prodigious and
damaging zebra mussel, a European arrival. Working Group to Consider Pollution by Ballast Water, 2
IMO NEWS 4 (1990). Thus, while a peregrine organism might be harmless in its natural environment,
it can become unpredictably virulent if placed in surroundings lacking its natural predators or other
controlling factors.
20. COMMITrEE ON TANK VESSEL DESIGN, supra note 15, at 47.
21. MARPOL 78, supra note 8, Annex I, reg. 13A, at 558.
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II. HISTORY LEADING To MARPOL 73/78
For much of the twentieth century, vessel pollution has been recognized
as an international problem. 22 In 1954, the international community acted
for the first time through the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil.23 The Convention's scope, however, was
limited to prohibiting discharges within fifty miles of land. Later, in 1962,
the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)24 called a
conference which amended the Convention so that it applied to smaller gross
tonnage and extended the zones where dumping was prohibited.25
The problem with OILPOL 54 and its 1962 amendments was that they
did little more than move oil pollution outside coastal areas. They did
nothing to reduce the amount of oil being introduced into the oceans. In
1969, OILPOL amendments adopted the LOT system.26  This system was
promoted by the oil companies as a cost-effective solution to proposals
calling for ships to be outfitted with expensive and unproven oil separating
technology.27 In part, LOT was adopted because the oil companies had
already installed the technology in the majority of their ships in an effort to
head off competing ideas on how to strengthen environmental regulations.28
22. In 1926, the United States, a coastal state, called an international shipping conference to
prevent shippers from making operational discharges into the sea. In 1934, the United Kingdom asked
the League of Nations to address the problem. In both cases, the international community's response
was tepid, although the United States was successful in getting seven major maritime nations to
voluntarily accept a 50 mile coastal discharge prohibition zone. Curtis, supra note 17, at 685.
23. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, opened for
signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL 54]. 32 countries,
representing 95% of the world's shipping tonnage, were in the conference. Curtis, supra note 17, at 684.
24. Shaw et al., supra note 3, at 164. The IMCO was an agency of the United Nations
responsible for marine pollution matters. Its role was strictly to be a consultative and advisory body.
The IMCO has since been succeeded by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which continues
to serve as an advisory body. Id.
25. 1962 Amendment to OILPOL 54, Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, 600 U.N.T.S. 332
[hereinafter 1962 Amendments].
26. 1969 Amendments to OILPOL 54, Oct. 21, 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205 [hereinafter 1969
Amendments].
27. M'GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 12, at 96. At the conference for the 1969 Amendments,
the U.K. wanted a prohibition on all discharges from ships over 20,000 tons. As part of the restriction,
ships would have very large oil separators which could purify discharges and store oil residues. This
separation technology, however, was expensive for shipowners (as well as States, who would have to
build reception facilities to take in the oily wastes) and unproven. In contrast, the LOT system could
be immediately implemented with only minor adjustments to existing ships. Id. at 94.
28. Id. at 98. By 1965, oil companies had unilaterally installed LOT in 60% of their tanker
tonnage and were considering it for another 18%. "Thus, their actions can almost be viewed as an
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LOT, however, did not produce the environmental gains promised by its
proponents. This was due, in part, to the difficulty in operating the system
correctly, even by a trained crew. As a result, LOT often produced
inadequate oil and water separation. But it was also due to unconscientious
crews, who found it easy to circumvent LOT and to simply discharge
untreated ballast waters.29 By the early 1970s, the problems with LOT
were clear. In 1973, the United States threatened to take unilateral action
in regulating tankers if an effective international solution was not reached.
The United States wanted SBTs to be installed on all tankers and, as a result
of the pressure exerted by the United States, the international community
convened the conference which passed MARPOL 7320
MARPOL 73 represented a break from OILPOL 54 and its amendments.
Although it included all of the old requirements and standards, prohibition
zones and LOT, there was much that was new. For example, for the first
time ships were required to have SBT and oil separating equipment. Also,
the Convention applied not only to tankers, but to all ships operating on the
oceans. These requirements were tightened further in the 1978 protocol,
which was drafted in such a way that it absorbed the parent Convention.
The combined instrument is usually known by the acronym MARPOL
73/78." !
III. THE MECHANICS OF MARPOL 73/78
MARPOL 73/78 is a convention which seeks nothing less than "the
complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by
oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental
discharge of such substances. ' 32 To achieve this end, the Convention sets
down very specific regulations for ships to observe. These regulations,
which address all aspects of vessel-source pollution, are contained within
five Annexes. 33 These annexes address, respectively, oil, chemicals, tanks
assumption of international legislative power-or at least forcing the hands of governments by presenting
them with a fait accompli." Id.
29. Id. at 108. In 1973, a consortium of oil companies undertook a secret survey of their ships
at their oil-loading terminals in the Middle East. They learned that one-third of the tankers were using
LOT well, one-third were using it poorly, and one-third did not use it at all. Id. at 110-11.
30. Id. at 107-14.
31. The Fight Against Marine Pollution, supra note 2, at 10.
32. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, preface, at 1319.
33. For the purposes of this Comment, only Annex I, governing oil pollution, is important.
1994] 495
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and containers, sewage, and garbage. MARPOL 73/78 also creates a regime
to enforce these regulations, although in comparison with the specific
regulations, this regime is less comprehensive. Under the enforcement
regime, flag states are primarily responsible for enforcing the Convention.
A. Annex I
Annex I contains all of the regulations pertaining to vessel oil pollution.
MARPOL 73/78 approaches the issue of controlling ship pollution from two
directions, one procedural and one technical. First, MARPOL 73/78 seeks
to reduce vessel pollution by regulating the shipboard operations which
generate pollution. Toward this end, it lays down procedures and
restrictions which ships must observe when discharging ballast water or
other wastes. MARPOL 73/78 also seeks to reduce vessel pollution by
requiring that ships be specially designed or reconfigured so as to eliminate
or reduce operational pollution. Unlike the first approach, which relies upon
crews keeping the ships' discharges as clean as possible and flag states to
detect and punish those ships which violate operational regulations, this
second approach relies upon structural solutions and technology to directly
reduce and monitor vessel pollution.
1. Technical regulations
Annex I adopts a sliding scale approach to design standards for vessels.
For new ships, the requirements are stiff: all must be equipped with
SBTs . 4 For older existing vessels, the requirements are less strict: COWs
or CBTs may be substituted in place of SBTs.3s The exact requirements,
Annex I can be found in MARPOL 78, supra note 8, at 550-78.
34. Ships are "new" if they are built after certain dates:
New Ships New Tankers
(MARPOL 73) (MARPOL 78)
Contract date after Dec. 31, 1975 June 1, 1979
Keel laid after June 30, 1976 Jan. 1, 1980
Delivered after Dec. 31, 1979 June 1, 1982
All ships which are not "new" are classified as "existing." (Note that MARPOL 73 refers to "new
ships," while MARPOL 78 uses the term "new tankers.") MARPOL 73, supra note 7, reg. 1(6), at 1336;
MARPOL 78, supra note 8, Annex I, reg. 13, at 551.
35. MARPOL 78, supra note 8, reg. 13B, at 559.
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summarized below, depend upon the type of vessel, its age, and its dead
weight tonnage.
Summary of requirements of MARPOL 73/78
for COW, SBT and CBT3'
New tankers At entry into force
Product 30,000 dwt+ SBT
Crude 20,000 dwt+ SBT, COW
Existing tankers
Crude 40-70,000 dwt SBT or COW or CBT
CBT option dropped" after four years
Crude 70,000 dwt+ SBT or COW or CBT
CBT option dropped after two years
Product 40,000 dwt+ SBT or CBT
Beyond the design requirement of SBTs, Annex I also requires that
ships have the equipment necessary to operate the LOT system and to retain
oily residues on board until they can be discharged into shore reception
facilities. This equipment includes slop tanks, oily-water separating
equipment or filtering systems, oil content meters, suitable pump and piping
arrangements, and sludge tanks."
Finally, Annex I requires ships to be equipped with systems that can
monitor and control oily discharges. Like a "black box," this hardware is
to continuously record either "the discharge in litres per nautical mile and
total quantity discharged, or the oil content and rate of discharge." '39 All
record entries must be made according to time and date and be kept for at
36. See MARPOL 73/78, 4 IMO NEWS 12 (1982).
37. Because of the expense involved with converting to SBTs or COWs, existing tankers were
given a grace period in which CBTs were allowed while the ships gradually came into compliance with
the new standards. Id.
38. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, Annex I, reg. 14-18, at 1352-58.
39. Id. reg. 15(3)(a), at 1354.
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least three years.40 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution
A.496(XII),4" recognizes three categories of cargo monitoring systems:
control units, computing units, and calculating units.42
Like the SBTs, there is a sliding scale for cargo monitoring equipment.
For new tankers this equipment was mandatory. Conversely, most existing
tankers had until three years after the ratification of the Convention before
installation was required. Because existing tankers comprise a great
majority of global tonnage, the IM0 43 concluded that incentives should be
given to encourage equipment compliance before it became compulsory."
Obviously, the extent to which these [cargo monitoring] systems are
reliable and tamper-proof varies significantly between the categories
established. It was the concerted opinion of IMO, however, that the
prompt installation of an inferior device was more consonant with
the goals of MARPOL 73/78 than the delayed implementation of a
more efficacious system.
... [As an example of this rationale,] new tankers of over 4,000
deadweight tons installing cargo monitors since June 1, 1982 are
required to use control units. If a vessel of this description opted
to install a system prior to that date, a computing unit was
sufficient. Computing units are also required for existing tankers of
more than 20,000 deadweight tons, but if the vessel owner
procrastinated later than October 2, 1984 in attaching the unit, a
starting interlock was also necessary.45
40. Id.
41. IMO Resolution A.496(XII), § 4, reprinted in 33 C.F.R. Part 157, Appendix F (1993).
42. Of the three, the control units system is the most sophisticated, automated, and tamper-proof.
It comes with devices which prevent the discharge valve from being opened when the monitoring system
is out of order (starting interlock) and which close the valve when the discharge rate exceeds a
permissible rate (discharge valve control). The second best cargo monitoring device is the computing
units system. Although it too is automated, it tracks less information, and it allows crews to manually
insert data into the discharge record. Starting interlock and discharge valve control devices are not
generally required for these systems. Finally, there is the minimal calculating system. With this system
most of the data is manually entered. Starting interlock and discharge valve control are not required.
David M. Collins, The Tanker's Right of Harmless Discharge and Protection of the Marine Environment,
18 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 275, 284 (1987).
43. See supra note 24.
44. Collins, supra note 42, at 283.
45. Id. at 284-85.
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Under Resolution A.496(XII), the earlier a ship is outfitted with cargo
monitoring equipment, the more relaxed is the standard required.46
2. Operational Requirements
The underlying reason for the monitoring systems, described above, is
to make sure that a ship's operational discharges meet the precise standards
of Annex I. For tankers, these standards are: 1) a ship may not leak more
than 1/30,000th of its total carrying capacity into the ocean; 2) the rate at
which oil may be discharged must not exceed sixty liters per mile traveled
by the ship; and 3) no discharge of any oil whatsoever can be made within
fifty miles of the nearest land or in certain special areas.47 For other
vessels, the standards are a little more relaxed: 1) the oil content of
effluents must be less than 100 parts per million; and 2) no discharge
whatsoever can be made within twelve miles of the nearest land or in certain
special areas.48
Under Annex I, tankers and other ships are obligated to use the LOT
system to extract oily residues from operational waters. These oily wastes
must be retained on board in slop tanks for later transfer into shore reception
facilities.49 Parties to the Convention are obligated to provide adequate
facilities for reception of residues and oily mixtures at loading terminals,
repair ports, and other ports frequented by ships which have oily residues
to discharge.5" Furthermore, tankers and other ships must carry and
maintain an oil record book in which all operations involving oil are to be
recorded. Every movement of oil from loading to discharge, on a tank to
tank basis, must be logged in the book. This book can be inspected by the
authorities of any State which is a Party to the Convention.51
46. IMO Resolution A.496(XII), supra note 41, § 3.3.
47. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, Annex I, reg. 9(l)(a), at 1343-44. The Convention recognizes
that certain enclosed bodies of water are particularly vulnerable to vessel pollution. Accordingly, it
prohibits all dumping in these "special areas": the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, and Red Seas, and the
Persian Gulf. Id. Annex 1, reg. 10, at 1345-46.
48. Id. Annex I, reg. 9(l)(b), at 1344.
49. Id. Annex I, reg. 15-17, at 1353-58.
50. Id. Annex I, reg. 12, at 1350-56. Parties to the Convention are also obliged to provide
reception facilities if their coastlines border on any of the environmentally sensitive areas. Id. Annex
I, reg. 10, at 1347.
51. Id. Annex I, reg. 20, at 1359-61.
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B. The Enforcement Regime
Parties to MARPOL 73/78 may enforce the Convention in three ways:
through ship inspections to ensure vessels meet minimum technical
standards, by monitoring ship compliance with discharge standards, and by
punishing ships which violate the standards.
1. Inspection
MARPOL 73/78 requires that ships meet various technical standards.
Responsibility for seeing that these standards are met lies with the various
flag states. Under the enforcement framework, every State has a duty to
make sure that ships which fly its flag or which are under its control comply
with MARPOL 73/78. Although generally the flag states have great
discretion over how best to carry out this duty, 2 they are obligated to
inspect tankers and large ships. 3
For tankers and large ships, flag states are periodically required to
conduct thorough inspections of ships to guarantee that their "structure,
equipment, fittings, arrangements and material fully comply with the
applicable requirements [of Annex I].''54  The Convention requires flag
states to conduct inspections, or "surveys," before a ship is put into service
or when issuing a five year International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
(IOPP). After that, the timing of the surveys varies, but at minimum one
must be conducted every five years." The force behind the survey is that
a ship which fails to pass the quality test cannot sail until it has been
brought up to MARPOL's standards.
In addition to the flag states, port states also have some authority to
survey ships and confine those which fall below MARPOL's standards.
This port state authority is contingent on whether a ship at a port or an off-
shore terminal has an IOPP certificate. If a ship has no certificate, a port
state may conduct a full survey. If, however, a ship is carrying a valid
52. "The Administration [flag state] shall establish appropriate measures for ships ... in order
to ensure that the applicable provisions of this Annex are complied with." Id. Annex I, reg. 4(2), at
1340.
53. MARPOL requires surveys for tankers of 150 gross tons and above and for other ships of
400 gross tons and above. Id. Annex I, reg. (4)(1), at 1340.
54. Id.
55. Id. Annex I, reg. 4, 5, at 1340-41.
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certificate from a flag state, the port state is obligated to honor the document
as if it were its own.56 The vessel must be accepted as passing MARPOL
73/78's standards. The only time a port state can go beyond the IOPP
Certificate and conduct a complete survey is if there are "clear grounds for
believing that the condition of the ship or its equipment does not correspond
substantially with the particulars of that certificate."57 Intervention would
be warranted, for example, if a crew had removed monitoring equipment
which was originally listed on the ship's certificate.
2. Monitoring
A second component of the enforcement regime is state monitoring of
vessel discharges. MARPOL 73/78 requires all parties to cooperate in
detecting ship violations and to use "all appropriate and practicable measures
of detection and environmental monitoring, adequate procedures for
reporting and accumulation of evidence."58 If a State has evidence of a
MARPOL 73/78 violation, it must forward this proof to the flag state
responsible for the deviant vessel.5
But, while MARPOL 73/78 charges States with the duty of policing the
oceans, most violators are not caught on the high seas, for several reasons.
First, States have neither the resources nor the interest to patrol the many
millions of ocean miles. Second, once an oil slick is discovered, it is
difficult to build up sufficient evidence to link it to a particular ship.'
Without pictures of a long slick of oil trailing behind a vessel, the usual
method for detecting a MARPOL 73/78 violation is observing a discharge
while a ship is docked.6' MARPOL 73/78 gives port states the authority
to conduct discharge inspections on any ships docked at a port or an off-
56. Id. art. V, at 1322-23.
57. Id. art. V(2), at 1323.
58. Id. art. VI(l), at 1323-24.
59. Id. art. VI(3), at 1324.
60. Curtis, supra note 17, at 707.
61. And even then a photograph might not be enough. In 1975, when OILPOL 54 was the
controlling treaty, France photographed the West German vessel Stadt Emden with an oil trail 6 nautical
miles long and 100 meters wide. Although this evidence was forwarded to German authorities, the courts
dismissed the case for lack of evidence. In 1978, France used photographs to document 44 violations.
Although this evidence was forwarded to the flag States involved, in not one case was a fine imposed.
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 517-18.
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shore terminal under their jurisdiction.62 In a discharge inspection, the port
state would look mainly at a ship's oil record book in which the ship's
operator records all movements of oil during a voyage. If a ship has oil
discharge monitoring equipment installed, this too would be important
evidence.63 Finally, if a ship does not have normal amounts of dirty
ballast, or oily residues stored in its slop tank, this would be prima facie
evidence of an improper operational discharge.'
3. Punishment
The last component of the enforcement regime is the punishment of
vessels which have illegally discharged oil. Once a flag state has received
notice or evidence that one of its ships has violated MARPOL 73/78, it must
investigate. If this obligatory investigation turns up sufficient evidence to
bring an action against the vessel, then the flag state must initiate a legal
proceeding to judge the matter. In the spirit of cooperation, it must then
promptly inform the party which reported the violation of the action
taken.65 When punishing a ship, the flag state must impose penalties that
are "adequate in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention
and shall be equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur."66
IV. MARPOL 73/78 CRITIQUED
MARPOL 73/78 has been immensely successful in bringing the world's
merchant fleet under its rules. Today, seventy countries, whose fleets
comprise about ninety percent of global shipping tonnage, have ratified the
Convention.67 As MARPOL's reach has expanded, pollution has declined.
62. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, art. VI(2), at 1324.
63. Curtis, supra note 17, at 706.
64. In 1980, the United Kingdom entered into MARPOL 73/78. Thereafter, authorities at a
Scotland reception facility notified all oil tankers that they would be refised berths if they came into port
with less dirty ballast water than normal, indicating an illegal dump at sea. Id. at 700-01.
65. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, art. VI(4), at 1324.
66. Id. art. IV(4), at 1322.
67. MARPOL 73/78 Amended for New and Existing Tankers, supra note 10, at 3. There are,
however, significant exceptions: of the oil-exporting countries, only a few have signed the Convention
and only 65 of the 125 nations with seacoasts that must assume responsibility for ships leaving their
harbors have signed the Convention. Andrea Berghuizen, A Sea of Troubles, WORLD PRESS REV., June
1993, v.40, at 45, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
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During the 1980s, marine oil pollution dropped by as much as sixty
percent.68 Even more dramatic has been the fall in oil pollution from
operational discharges. From 1973, when MARPOL 73/78 was first drafted,
until 1990, tanker operational pollution dropped eighty-five percent.69
Despite this success, however, MARPOL 73/78 is not without its problems.
A. Annex I
1. Technical Regulations
The SBT requirement is a good idea which was only partially
implemented. If all ships were required to be equipped with SBTs, the
problem of oily ballast water would be eliminated. Annex I, however,
stopped short of such a sweeping requirement. It made SBTs mandatory,
but only for new vessels. Existing ships were exempt. This was a mistake
because it slowed down the process of upgrading the environmental quality
of the fleet as a whole. Faced with the prospect of purchasing expensive
new vessels equipped with SBTs, many shipowners opted instead to hold
onto their existing vessels for longer than usual. This has been the case
with the world's tanker fleet, fifty percent of which were built between
fifteen and nineteen years ago. 70  Had SBTs been required on existing
vessels, many ships would have been retired earlier than usual since
retrofitting would have not been cost efficient.
7
'
But while it might have been better if SBTs were universal, this
approach was unpalatable to many of the States drafting MARPOL 73/78.
The two-tiered approach was the result of a compromise. In MARPOL 73,
as the result of U.S. pressure, SBTs were required for the first time, but only
on new oil tankers of 70,000 dwt and above. All other ships were exempt.
68. See Marine Environment and Development: the IMO Role, 3 IMO NEWS 8 (1992)
(discussing a 1990 report by the National Research Council Marine Board of the United States).
69. The National Research Council estimated that tanker operational losses released 1.08 million
tons of oil into the ocean in 1973. For 1985, the Council estimated these operational losses at 0.41
million tons. For 1990, the U.S. Coast Guard updated the Council estimates and found operational losses
to be 0.16 million tons. COMMITTEE ON TANK VESSEL DESIGN, supra note 15, at 23.
70. Marine Environment and Development: the IMG Role, supra note 68, at 8.
71. Apart from the cost of SBTs, a second disincentive is the practice of some port States
collecting charges and dues on the additional gross tonnage of the SBTs. Concern Over Segregated
Ballast Tanker Port Dues Expressed by Intertanko, LLOYDS LIST, Aug. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuters File.
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U.S. demands for SBTs were born of its frustrations with LOT, which the
United States did not believe was working.72 The United States saw SBTs
as a way to bypass LOT. In negotiations leading up to MARPOL 73/78, the
United States lobbied for the SBT requirement to be extended to all ships
above 20,000 dwt. This proposal was vigorously opposed by major
shipping states, who would have had to absorb the enormous cost of
retrofitting the world fleet." In place of SBTs, shipping advocates argued
for COWs, which they said would substantially reduce all tanker residues
without the use of a salt water wash. COW advocates also distinguished
COWs from LOT. They noted that unlike LOT, which takes place at sea
away from supervision, crude oil cleaning takes place at the unloading port
where a governing body is likely to conduct an adequate inspection. In the
end, both sides compromised by requiring new tankers of 20,000 dwt and
above to have SBTs, but allowing existing tankers to choose between the
SBT, COW, or CBT systems.74
A much more unsatisfactory and unnecessary compromise was made in
regard to cargo hold monitors. The idea of a cargo monitoring system was
first introduced into MARPOL 73 by the United States. Although
technology for monitoring refined products (white oils) did not exist at the
time, the United States believed that it would become commercially
available if mandated. Other conferees were doubtful.7 5 Accordingly, they
included an escape hatch which empowered the IMO to waive the
requirement for carriers of white oil if it judged that reliable cargo monitors
did not yet exist. 76 Additionally, in recognition of the cost involved with
retrofitting, existing tankers did not have to install monitors until three years
after the Convention came into force.77
The compromise was fair at the time. It made sense to have an escape
hatch in case the technology never did materialize, as well as a three year
grace period for the older ships to comply. However, when the technology
did develop, the IMO conceded even more ground. When the technology
72. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
73. Estimates of the cost of retrofitting the existing fleet with SBT varied widely. Supporters,
like the United States, estimated the cost to be $2.93 billion. The Oil Companies International Marine
Forum, however, set the conversion cost at $6 billion. M'GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 12, at 133.
74. See id. at 130-40.
75. Id. at 114.
76. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, Annex I, reg. 15(6), at 1355-56.
77. Id. Annex I, reg. 16(4), at 1357.
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became available, the IMO was impatient to outfit as many existing ships
as possible. It did not want to wait for the three year period to run. As a
result, it passed IMO Resolution A.496(XII), which exempted vessels
from more sophisticated monitoring systems later if they took on a less
reliable system immediately.79 This was a short-sighted solution because
three years was not a significant time to wait. Now, as with SBTs, the
general quality of the world fleet's monitoring systems will only be
upgraded when existing ships are turned to scrap.
2. Operational Standards
Today's shipowners find themselves in a curious Catch-22 situation with
Annex I's LOT requirement. Under Annex I, ships are obligated to run
their operational waters through a LOT procedure, retaining the oily residues
on board for later transfer to a reception facility. In turn, port states are
obligated to provide these reception facilities. Unfortunately, many States
have been reluctant to build these facilities because of the expense
involved. 0 The return on reception facility investments is seen as being
too low. The dimensions of this problem are illustrated by the situation in
the Mediterranean, where half of the littoral states have no reception
facilities at all."' For many tankers, the only option under these
circumstances is to discharge their oily wastes into the ocean and risk the
penalties.
The problem with inadequate reception facilities, however, is not the
fault of MARPOL 73/78. The blame lies fairly with the Contracting Parties
themselves. These Parties have ignored the fact that they have bound
themselves to construct facilities. Their eyes are only on the bottom line of
whether they can turn a profit with a reception facility. A possible solution
to the problem might lie in article 10, which deals with the settlement of
disputes. It provides that any disputes between Parties concerning the
78. IMO Resolution A.496(XII), supra note 41, § 3.3.
79. Collins, supra note 42, at 281-85.
80. International Chamber of Shipping Study (1990) reported that many contracting parties have
failed to ensure that facilities are provided, and where facilities are available there are often considerable
differences in charging for the reception of wastes. Marine Environment and Development: the IMO
Role, supra note 68, at 8.
81. Green Incentives-Adequate Reception Facilities for Tank Washings and Slops Must Be Paid
For, LLOYDS LIST, Oct. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
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interpretation or application of MARPOL 73/78 shall be submitted to
arbitration. This arbitration is binding. 2 Presumably a State could force
a port state to build a reception facility by taking the defaulting Party to
arbitration.
B. The Enforcement Regime
The weak link in MARPOL 73/78 has been its reliance on flag states as
the primary enforcement agents. Under the Convention, a flag state is
vested with the exclusive right and duty to inspect and certify its vessels.8 3
A flag state is also exclusively responsible for investigating and punishing
its ships when they violate MARPOL 73/78's operational standards. Coastal
states and port states, on the other hand, generally have limited jurisdiction
over the ships flagged by other countries.8 4 If a ship discharges within the
territorial waters of a coastal state, then the ship would be subject to the
coastal state's jurisdiction. Beyond these territorial waters, however, the role
of nonflag states is restricted to monitoring and reporting ship violations.8 5
A major problem with the flag state system has been the widespread use
by shipowners of flags of convenience (FOC). FOC are flags of certain
countries whose laws make it easy and attractive for ships owned by foreign
nationals or companies to fly these flags.8 6 For the shipowners, the
benefits of a convenience registry are many: easy registration of ships,
lower taxes, reduced operating expenses, and greater freedom from control
by the flag state. For the FOC state, the benefit is the income brought from
82. The procedures for arbitration are contained within Protocol II: Arbitration, reprinted in 12
I.L.M. 1441 (1973).
83. MARPOL 73, supra note 7, art. V, at 1323.
84. Coastal states have historically claimed sovereignty over their coastal waters. These waters
are known as the territorial waters. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the breadth of the
territorial sea was set by criteria such as the limits of visibility. Later the rule developed that sovereignty
extended to the furthest point which could be controlled by a shore-based cannon. Today, the
international standard is 12 miles, as set by the Law of the Sea Convention. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 65-67 (1988).
85. This vesting of exclusive authority within the flag states has deep roots in the law governing
the seas. For centuries, maritime law has been guided by the principle of free navigation, be it for
military or commercial interests. The corollary of this principle has been the flag state monopoly as it
exists today. Under it, States are barred from interfering with the movement and trade of vessels flying
the flag of another State. See G. KEETON & G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW & CUSTOM OF THE SEA
57-65 (1959).
86. Richard J. Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security?,
3 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (1980).
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the ship's registry.87 Convenience registries have undermined MARPOL
73/78's pollution control efforts. With the vast majority of FOC states
classified as developing or Third World states, most of these States do not
have the resources to properly regulate their huge fleets. Furthermore,
because of their dependence upon registry income, these States do not have
the inclination to rigorously prevent and punish pollution from their
multinational clients.88
Because convenience registry states do not have the economic or
political incentive to protect the oceans, MARPOL 73/78 needs to be
strengthened. One solution would be to break the flag state hegemony and
give other States a stronger role in enforcement. Nonflag states should be
given the authority to inspect other countries' vessels, as well as to
investigate and punish MARPOL 73/78 violations. Among the strongest
advocates for expanding nonflag powers have been the coastal states. In the
Convention which produced MARPOL 73, they argued that the traditional
division between a narrow territorial sea and the high seas was an
anachronism. Because vessel pollution most often occurs outside territorial
waters and then moves into coastal waters, coastal states wanted their sphere
of environmental jurisdiction expanded.89 Marine states, on the other hand,
were worried about their vessels being subject to the jurisdiction of other
countries. They feared that unscrupulous states might use environmental
enforcement as a device to hassle and prosecute their ships for political
reasons.90 The United States was one of those concerned-in particular, the
Department of Defense.9'
Both sides agreed to a compromise. In the end, the coastal state
reformers were left with only a promise that if international law changed,
so too would their power:
Under article 4, the flag state was to prohibit violations "under the
law of the Administration" of the ship, while the coastal state would
also prohibit such violations "within the jurisdiction" of the state.
Additionally, it was stipulated that the latter clause was, by article
87. Shaw et al., supra note 3, at 160-63.
88. Payne, supra note 86, at 72.
89. M'GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 12, at 207-08.
90. See id. at 208-09.
91. Id. at 209-10.
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9(3), to "be constructed in the light of international law in force at
the time of application or interpretation of the present Convention."
This latter formulation left to UNCLOS [United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea] III the task of deciding the limits of
particular coastal state jurisdictions which would then be applied
retroactively to the 1973 Convention.
92
In the meantime, the flag state monopoly was left in place.
Given that MARPOL 73/78 chose to retain the traditional flag state
system, it should have at the very least established basic standards for flag
state enforcement. As it is, the Convention allows each State to decide how
best to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. For example, while
States are obligated to inspect and certify tankers, what constitutes a passing
grade varies from State to State. Similarly, while every State is required to
investigate discharge violations and punish ships if there is sufficient
evidence, what constitutes "sufficient evidence" depends upon each State.
V. DOUBLE-HULL AMENDMENTS
In 1993, major amendments to MARPOL 73/78 came into force
requiring that all tankers be outfitted with double-hulls.93  These
amendments were long awaited. The United States had unsuccessfully
lobbied for a double-hull requirement to be included in MARPOL 73 and
then again in MARPOL 78.' In reviewing these latest changes to
MARPOL, two conclusions can be drawn: they are a natural extension of
MARPOL 73/78's emphasis upon a "structural" solution to pollution, and
like other key Convention requirements, such as the SBT requirements, these
latest amendments make pragmatic concessions to industry interests in order
to gain acceptance for a controversial environmental standard.
92. Id. at 208.
93. The concept of a double-hull is simply that the cargo tanks are separated from the outer hull
by means of a space large enough to absorb low speed impacts. In the event of a grounding or an
accidental collision, a double-hull provides a measure of protection against the outflow of oil. As with
SBTs, the process of retrofitting a ship with a double-hull is complex, costly, and time consuming.
Steering Committee Report Backs Double-hull and Mid-deck Tanker Designs, 1 IMO NEws 3 (1992).
94. Tammy M. Alcock, "Ecology Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of
Efforts to Require Double-hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 97, 128-29 (1992).
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The amendment modifications came in the form of two new regulations,
which were added to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. The first, regulation 13F,
governs new tankers of 600 dwt or above. If the tanker is above 5,000 dwt,
then 13F requires double bottoms and wing tanks extending the full depth
of the ship's side.95 The second, regulation 13G, governs existing crude
carriers of 30,000 dwt or above. For existing ships which comply with the
standards laid down in MARPOL 73/78, 13G gives these ships no more than
thirty years after the date of delivery to comply with the double-hull
requirements of 13F. Ships which already had double-hulls were specially
exempted from the thirty year refitting requirement.96 For existing ships
built according pre-MARPOL standards, 13G gives no more than twenty-
five years after the date of delivery for these ships to be fitted with side or
bottom protection covering at least thirty percent of the cargo tank area.97
The debate over these double-hull amendments was extensive. On one
side, double-hull advocates argued that their design would guard against
spills caused by groundings or collisions, would make ships easier to clean,
faster to load and unload, and would increase each tanker's payload by
replacing the SBTs, which on single-hulled ships are limited to holding
ballast. Critics countered that double-hull ships would be more dangerous
than conventional ships because explosive vapors might be trapped between
hulls. Additionally, these critics questioned the stability of double-hull
tankers after an accident by arguing that such ships would be more likely to
capsize.98 But of all the arguments against the double-hull design, the
strongest was the increased cost. In 1973, the United States made its
proposal for double-hulls, submitting a supporting study which concluded
the increased costs of double-hull ships to be nine percent. 99 Today it is
estimated that a double-hull tanker costs around $85 million, which is fifteen
95. MARPOL 73/78 Amended for New and Existing Tankers, supra note 10, at 3. A ship is
"new" if its building contract was placed on or after July 6, 1993, whose keel was laid on or after
January 6, 1994, or which is delivered on or after July 6, 1996. If a ship is not "new," it is then
classified as an "existing" ship. Id.
96. Ships built in accordance with MARPOL 73/78 are those ships which were ordered after
June 1, 1979, whose keels were laid after January 1, 1980, or which were delivered after June 1, 1982.
See supra note 34.
97. MARPOL 73/78 Amended for New and Existing Tankers, supra note 10, at 3.
98. Alcock, supra note 94, at 107-13.
99. Id. at 128.
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to twenty percent more than it costs to build a standard single-hull
tanker.'°
In recent years, the balance in this debate has shifted in favor of the
double-hull. After several spectacular accidents, such as the Exxon Valdez
and the 1992 mishap off Scotland, political pressure built up worldwide to
put an end to catastrophic oil spills. It was in response to these expectations
that the double-hull amendments, proposed again by the United States in
1990, l"' were accepted into MARPOL 73/78.12 In their final form,
however, a concession was made to shipping interests. Rather than making
double-hulls mandatory, the amendments made double-hulls the
environmental standard against which ships would be judged. Specifically,
regulation 13F allows mid-deck tankers"°3 with double-sided hulls to be
an alternative to double-hull construction. Also acceptable are other
methods of design and construction so long as they ensure the same level
of protection against pollution in the event of a collision or stranding."°
The United States did not believe the mid-deck design was as effective
as the double-hull and unsuccessfully resisted changes allowing alternatives
to the double-hull. °5 Under the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
all new tankers built after 1994 must have double-hulls, with no
exceptions. 6 The United States wanted MARPOL 73/78 to be consistent
100. Hugh Carnegy, Slowly Acquiring A Thicker Skin, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at 9. The
additional construction cost is explained by the greater complexity of the double-hull design. To build
a double-shell very large crude carrier (VLCC) typically requires 20 percent more steelwork and man-
hours than a single-skin ship. MARPOL Prompts Building Push In Japan, SHIPYARD WK., May 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
101. Steering Committee Report Backs Double-hull and Mid-deck Tanker Designs, supra note 93,
at 3.
102. See Carnegy, supra note 100.
103. Developed and advocated by Japan, the mid-deck tanker design fits ships with wing ballast
tanks to provide protection against collision and arranges cargo tanks so that there is upward pressure
at the bottom of the hull. If the hull is ruptured, this pressure prevents most of the oil on board from
escaping into the sea. Steering Committee Report Backs Double-hull and Mid-deck Tanker Designs,
supra note 93, at 3. A U.S. Coast Guard study comparing the mid-deck design with the double-hull
concluded that the mid-deck design performs better than the double-hull when punctured, spilling less
oil, but that the double-hull is superior in groundings where its second hull is not punctured. US.
Engineering Company Delivers Study on Alternative Tanker Designs to USCG, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE
REP., Vol. XV, No. 34, Aug. 27, 1992, at I, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. One expert
succinctly put the difference between the two designs this way: "Do we (the U.S.) want a lot of small
spills (with the mid-deck), or a few large spills (with the double-hull)?" Id.
104. MARPOL 73/78 Amended for New and Existing Tankers, supra note 10, at 3.
105. IMO Agrees to New Rules on Design--Committee Fixes Criteria For Double-Hulled Tankers
to Reduce Pollution, LLOYDS LIST, Mar. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Current File.
106. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2735 (1992).
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with this Act. 1°7 In response to the United States, the IMO established a
steering committee to study the effectiveness of the mid-deck design.'08
This study, which was financially supported by industry groups, concluded
that the mid-deck and double-hull designs were basically equivalent. 9
Based upon the study, the final amendments allowed the mid-deck design
to be an alternative to the double-hull.
Currently tanker accidents account for only five percent of all oil
pollution at sea."0 While the comparative merits of the double-hull and
mid-deck designs are debatable, unquestionably either will reduce the
amount of oil that enters the ocean from spills. Like past MARPOL
structural requirements, the double-hull regulations have the advantage of
upgrading the quality of the shipping fleet and protecting the ocean
independent of any state involvement. The impact of these regulations,
however, will not be as dramatic as past structural regulations. During the
mid-1970s the demand for tanker tonnage, especially VLCCs, peaked and
then collapsed. Nearly half the world's tanker tonnage consists of ships of
160,000 dwt or above and the majority of them are now at least fifteen
years old. Since these very large crude carriers (VLCC) do not comply with
MARPOL 73/78, they have less than a decade to meet the recent double-hull
107. Aline Sullivan, E.C. Tanker Rules, Bus. INS., Feb. 15, 1993, at 47, 47-49.
108. IMO Says Japanese Tanker Design As Effective As Double-hulls In Oil Spills, BNA INT'L
ENV'T DAILY, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED File. The study was
undertaken under pressure from the industry, the Japanese government, and the leading Japanese
shipbuilder, Mitsubishi. Id. Mitsubishi was involved because it initially developed the mid-deck tanker
design. See Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Hopes for First New VLCC Order, LLOYDS LIST, Oct. 9, 1992,
available in Westlaw, International News File. This heavy Japanese involvement led to a subsequent
protest from the Republic of South Korea, which, before the double-hull amendments were approved,
discovered an application for an international patent from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for its mid-deck
tanker design which was identical to the mid-deck design alternative included in the double-hull
amendments. IMO Agrees New Rules on Design-Committee Fixes Criteria For Double-Hulled Tankers
to Reduce Pollution, supra note 105.
109. Among the groups which funded the study were the oil and tanker industry, classification
societies, shipbuilders, and model testing basins. Steering Committee Report Backs Double-hull and Mid-
deck Tanker Designs, supra note 93, at 3-4.
110. Today, with MARPOL 73/78 in force, tanker accidents account for only 5% of all oil
pollution at sea, tanker operations account for 7%, other shipping accounts for 14%, and the remaining
74% comes from industrial waste. Camegy, supra note 100, at 9. Given that tanker accidents account
for such a small share of ocean oil pollution, a legitimate question is whether the benefits of double-hulls
are worth the economic cost. In 1992, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) released an interim regulatory
impact analysis on the impact of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and concluded that the total cost to
industry of implementing its double-hull requirement would reach $1.5 billion per year by 2015. USCG
Sets Dimensions for Double-Hull Spaces on Tankers, OIL SPILL U.S. L. REP., Jan., 1993, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Current File.
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standards or they will be scrapped."' In the VLCC class, these
regulations will have a significant impact. Conversely, during the 1980s,
there was considerable demand for tankers of up to 60,000 dwt, the vast
majority of which do comply with MARPOL 73/78. For these younger,
more recently built ships, the double-hull compliance window is thirty years
after the date of delivery. With these smaller ships, the regulations in the
short term will have only a minor impact, as most can operate unmodified
well into the next century."2
VI. CONCLUSION
MARPOL 73/78 is environmentally less effective than it should be.
While SBTs are one of the most reliable ways to ensure clean discharges,
the treaty only requires new ships to have SBTs. Older vessels are allowed
to sail under more relaxed standards. From the point of view of an
environmentalist, all vessels, both new and existing, should be required to
have these tanks. Equally lacking is MARPOL's enforcement regime. The
best way to ensure that ships comply with the treaty would be to allow all
States to inspect vessels and punish detected violators. The treaty, however,
leaves enforcement primarily in the hands of flag States, who lack the
resources and the will to prevent and catch polluters.
While MARPOL 73/78 could be stronger environmentally, it is still a
good treaty for two reasons. First, notwithstanding the failings of ship
operators and flag states to observe and enforce the treaty's discharge
standards, the treaty has had a direct impact on vessel pollution through its
technical standards for ships. Second, generally speaking, the treaty is as
strong as it could have been, given the practical need to have marine states
ratify the Convention. This analysis holds true even with the latest
amendments to MARPOL 73/78, which deal with double-hulls. With these
new amendments, there was, on the one hand, an obvious focus upon
structural solutions which would be effective; on the other hand, drafters
took care to ensure that the amendments were not so onerous as to face
rejection by MARPOL 73/78's signatories.
There were many groups involved directly and indirectly in the drafting
of MARPOL 73/78. There were the environmentalists and coastal states,




who lobbied for a treaty which would impose tough standards on vessels
and extend the jurisdictional authority of nonflag states. These interests
were countered by those of ship owners, oil importers, and flag states, who
wanted cost-effective regulations and who were unwilling to cede authority
to nonflag states. The resulting treaty reconciled these conflicting interests.
Arguably, the final treaty conceded too much to the shippers and flag
states. After all, it was a major concession to these interests that older
existing vessels were exempted from the expensive SBT requirement and
that the flag state regime was left basically untouched. However, the
underlying goal of the treaty was to bring the world's shipping fleet under
the sphere of an international convention." 3 Had MARPOL 73/78 not
made these concessions to shipping interests, there was a risk that it would
not have been ratified by the major maritime states. As it was, it took ten
years from the drafting of the original MARPOL 73 before enough nations
signed the Convention to bring it into force." 4 Today, ninety percent of
the world's merchant fleet is subject to the Convention's imperfect
regulations, which is better than having 100 percent of the world's fleet
subject to no international environmental controls.
113. The two preconditions which had to be met before the treaty could come into force were:
it must be signed by at least 15 states, and the combined merchant fleets of the signing parties constitute
not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet. MARPOL 78, supra note 8, art.
V(I), at 548.
114. By 1976, for example, only three minor states had ratified MARPOL 73. States were
reluctant to commit for several reasons. First, they were leery of the monitoring systems requirement,
doubting that the necessary technology existed. Second, they viewed the obligation to build reception
facilities as being too expensive. Third, they were unhappy with the inseparable linkage between Annex
I (oil pollution) and Annex II (hazardous chemicals). M'GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 12, at 122.
This hesitation shows that States were carefully measuring the costs and benefits of signing and that, in
the eyes of marine States, the costs, as the treaty was drafted, were particularly high.
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